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Abstract  
We examine the causal effect of commuting distance on workers' wages in a quasi-natural 
experiments setting using information on all workers in Denmark. We account for endogeneity 
of distance by using changes in distance that are due to firms’ relocations. For the range of 
commuting distances where income tax reductions associated with commuting do not apply, one 
kilometre increase in commuting distance induces a wage increase of about 0.42%, suggesting an 
hourly compensation of about half of the hourly net wage. Our findings are consistent with wage 
bargaining theory and suggest a bargaining power parameter of about 0.50. Due to the 
experimental setup we are able to exclude many competing explanations of the wage-distance 
relationship. Keywords: Commuting, wages, bargaining theory .JEL codes: J22, R41 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the causal effect of commuting distance on wages from a wage bargaining 
perspective. One of the main issues we are concerned with is that distance may be endogenous 
with respect to wages. This is relevant because the literature emphasizes that it is not an easy task 
to find valid instruments for commuting distance, as it is related to labour and residence locations 
behaviour (Manning, 2003; Gubits, 2004). As emphasised by Manning (2003), but also in the 
literature study by Gibbons and Machin (2006), despite the large number of studies there is 
essentially no direct empirical evidence of the causal effect of commuting costs on wages. There 
are a number of reasons why the effect of the length of the commute on wages is of interest (for a 
review see Gibbons and Machin, 2006).  
Evidence on equilibrium relationships between wages and commuting is informative about 
the frictions in the labour market that transport infrastructure may help to alleviate. In a 
competitive labour market without search frictions, firms do not determine wage levels based on 
the worker’s commuting distance (as it is based on the worker’s productivity level). If firms pay 
compensating wages for longer commutes, then firms must enjoy some monopsony power in the 
labour market which allows them to pay wages below marginal product. In a wage bargaining 
context with job search frictions, workers with long commuting distances are able to bargain for 
higher wages, because their opportunity costs of staying with the firm are less than those for 
other workers. To be more precise, a range of bargaining models imply that workers will get a 
fixed share of their commuting costs reimbursed through higher wages (e.g. Marimom and 
Zilibotti, 1999; Van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005).1 This share is determined by the degree of 
employer market power, which plays a major role in a wide range of bargaining models 
                                                     
1
 Wage compensation does not occur when workers with long commutes are fully compensated in the housing 
market through lower housing prices (see Zenou, 2009). We control for housing market compensation by keeping 
residential location constant. 
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(Pissarides, 2000). In a competitive labour market, employers have no market power, so the 
share is zero. In a market where employers have full market power, the share is one (and worker 
receive a wage which makes them indifferent between working and being unemployed), so 
workers receive full compensation. There is virtually no direct evidence on what an appropriate 
value of this share (equivalent to the bargaining power parameter) should be (see e.g. Shimer, 
2005; Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007; and Gertler et al., 2008). It is one of the objectives of the 
current paper to determine the magnitude of this share for Denmark.2 Evidence on a causal effect 
of the commuting distance on the wage implies that workers receive (a part) of their total 
commuting costs (inclusive time costs) reimbursed through higher wages. 
The effect of the length of the commute on wages is also relevant in the context of income 
taxation. Income tax reductions for workers with a long commute can be found in many 
European countries (see Potter et al., 2006). In Denmark, workers with a one-way commute that 
exceeds 12.5 kilometres (about 50% of all workers) are entitled to a tax reduction. This tax 
reduction is based on a deduction that aims to compensate for monetary expenses associated with 
commuting per kilometre, i.e. fuel expenses, vehicle amortisation expenses, etc.3 More precisely, 
in 2003 the workers were entitled to deduct 3.2 DKK per daily one-way kilometre for commutes 
between 12.5 and 50 kilometres and 1.6 DKK for longer commutes from taxable gross income.4 
On average, these reductions imply an increase in net wage of about 33% of the reduction, so 
                                                     
2
 Since the early 1980s, the Danish labour market has experienced a trend towards more decentralized bargaining 
regime based on flexible wage structures, inequality, and market-induced restraint (Iversen, 1996). Given the 
flexible wage structures in Denmark, individual unions and their employer counterparts determine the general wage 
level, while the workers bargain for additional bonuses at the level of firm, so the overall wage level is bargained at 
the individual level. In addition, the Danish labour market is relatively flexible, i.e. worker turnover is relatively 
high (Mortensen, 2001) and the high level of turnover applies to most categories of employees and is not caused by 
a minor share of (unskilled) workers being extremely mobile (Madsen, 2002). 
3
 Employers seldomly reimburse commuting expenses explicitly (viz. through a fringe benefit), so we ignore this 
issue. Approximately 0.3% of workers have access to a company car. Including or excluding these workers does not 
affect estimation results. 
4
 One DKK is approximately 0.13€. In 2005, per daily one-way kilometre the tax deductions were 3.36 DKK and 
1.68 DKK respectively. 
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1.06 and 0.53 DKK per daily one-way kilometre respectively. This is substantial, as it implies an 
average net wage compensation of about 1.23% and 3.60% for commuting distances of 
respectively 12.5 and 50 one-way commuting kilometres (the average wage per working day was 
1,114 DKK). 
Despite the large theoretical and empirical debate around the relationship between wages 
and the length of the commute, it is maybe surprising that there is an absence of accurate 
empirical estimates of the causal effect of the length of the commute on wages (see e.g. Zax, 
1991; Manning, 2003). Hence, there is a knowledge gap between the theoretical and empirical 
literature. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by estimating the causal effect of workers' 
commuting distance on wages. We estimate (reduced-form) panel data models using matched 
data from workers and firms for Denmark. We are interested in two types of effects of 
commuting distance on wages. So, we discuss (i) the effect of commuting distance on wages for 
the range in commuting distance where the income tax reduction is not applicable (where the 
effect refers to overall (time and monetary) costs associated with commuting), and (ii) the effect 
where income tax reduction is applicable (where the effect refers principally to time costs losses 
associated with commuting).  
Our study deals with a range of statistical difficulties that have not been properly addressed 
in the literature by making use of exogenous changes in commuting distance due to firm 
relocations, which fits in the literature of quasi-natural experiments. Therefore, our study 
strongly contrasts with previous studies. Our estimates can be interpreted from a wage 
bargaining perspective, whereas interpretation of previous studies, mainly based on cross-section 
data, is not straightforward, because of alternative explanations (see e.g. Zax, 1991; White, 1977; 
Benito and Oswald, 1999; Manning, 2003; Simonsohn, 2006). In principle, in addition to the 
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wage bargaining explanation, there are at least four other explanations for a positive correlation 
between the length of the commute and wages. 
First, according to urban economic theory, workers with a higher income choose a different 
residence location and therefore a different commute (Wheaton, 1974). This explanation relates 
to reversed causation. Second, unobserved variables, such as skills, may affect both commuting 
distance and wages, causing spurious correlation between the length of the commute and wages 
(Manning, 2003). A common method of dealing with these two explanations is the use of an 
instrumental variable estimation procedure. The problem with this approach in the current setting 
is finding suitable instruments for the length of the commute as argued by Manning (2003). We 
use employer-induced changes in distances rather than an instrument variable approach.5 Third, 
given a competitive labour market, employers located at locations far from residences 
compensate workers with appropriately higher wages, which implies a spatial wage gradient (e.g. 
Fujita et al., 1997). This idea is confirmed by empirical findings (Timothy and Wheaton, 2001). 
We deal with this alternative explanation by using (year-specific) firm fixed effects. Fourth, 
Manning (2003) points out that, in a monopsonistic labour market with search frictions and a 
distribution of wages, workers receive many job offers but only those above a reservation wage 
are accepted; otherwise it pays to wait for further offers. The reservation wage rises with the 
commuting cost associated with the job offer. So, on average, wages rise with commuting 
distance because workers only accept distant jobs that, at least partially, compensate for 
additional commuting costs. We control for this explanation by focusing on changes in wages of 
workers who remain with their employer.  
The next section introduces the identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of 
                                                     
5
 Manning (2003) re-examines the results by Benito and Oswald (1999) and finds that the IV approach used by 
Benito and Oswald (1999) is sensitive to the choice of the instruments. 
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commutes on wages in a wage bargaining framework; Section 3 provides information on the data 
employed; Section 4 presents the empirical results; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Identification strategy 
Wage bargaining theory predicts a positive relationship between wages and commutes for 
workers, ceteris paribus. To guarantee the ceteris paribus condition, it is useful to focus on 
workers who stay with their employer and do not change residence. The hypothesis is then 
investigated using Danish register data on all workers that are matched to all firms that relocate. 
The worker’s commuting distance, defined by the residence and the workplace location, is 
usually self chosen by the worker. However, quite regularly, the workplace location is changed 
due to a relocation by the worker’s employer. The commuting distance change is then employer-
induced and therefore exogenous with respect to individual wages. In our approach, we only use 
these exogenous changes. The idea to use workplace relocation as a source of exogenous change 
in commuting distance is also exploited in Zax (1991) and Zax and Kain (1996), who analyse the 
effects of a relocation of a single firm on job and residential moving behaviour.6 The analysis of 
the relationship between wages and commuting distances based on exogenous changes in the 
distance due to firm relocation fits in the literature of quasi-natural experiments. 
More formally, our approach entails estimating a worker’s first-differences wage model 
with controls for worker- and firm-specific time-invariant factors. Let ,, denote the worker 
 wage in year 	 of firm 
. We assume the following specification of wages: 
,,    ,,  ,,  ,    ,,                                                   (1) 
                                                     
6
 See also Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010), who estimate distance effects on labour supply, but in 
their study firm relocations are not observed (but derived from job and residential mobility data). 
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where ,, is the worker  commuting distance in period 	 employed by firm 
. The matrix 
,, includes exogenous time-varying controls for workers’ and firms’ characteristics,  is a 
worker fixed effect, and ,, is the overall error. We emphasise that in (1) we have included 
year-specific firm fixed effects ,, which control for all year-specific differences between firms 
(e.g., firms’ size, firms’ location, firms’ sales, etc.). We estimate all models in terms of worker 
first-differences, that is, variables are formulated as changes from one time period to another, 
implying that: 
,,  ,,  ,,  ,,  ,,,,   ,  !,,   (2) 
where !,,  ,,  ,, and   ,  ,  ,. Thus, we use within-workers’ variation 
in commuting distance to explain within-worker’s variation in wages and further control for 
year-specific changes in firm characteristics.7 Consistent estimation of  requires that the 
change in commuting distance, ,,  ,,, is exogenous and therefore not related to !,,.  
In order to guarantee that the change in commuting distance is exogenous, we make two 
data selections. First, we select firms that changed location, so the change in commuting distance 
is the result of an employer-induced workplace relocation. This selection may create a selection 
bias as the set of firms that relocate may not be random. This bias is likely minimal however 
because we include (year-specific) firm fixed effects. Second, to control for voluntary worker 
changes in distance, we select workers (of firms that relocate) who did not change employer or 
residence (so we keep residence location constant). In this way, changes in distances are due to 
(usually unexpected) exogenous shocks in commuting distance.8 Selecting a sample of workers 
                                                     
7
 As we essentially have two periods in our data, this specification implies that we include only one , per firm. 
8
 The shock is usually unexpected, because firms do not announce long in advance that they consider relocating. 
This phenomenon may have several explanations. For example, a long announcement period may increase 
uncertainty, which may immediately increase worker job quitting behaviour, absenteeism, etc., which firms prefer to 
avoid. 
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who do not change employer and do who not change residence may create a selection bias. We 
will explicitly address the potential bias of this selection by comparing results of different 
samples and by estimating Heckman selection models. 
We are mainly interested in the effect of changes in commuting distance on changes in 
wages, so we have experimented with functional form for commuting distance, and employed 
different samples and selection procedures. Our estimate imply that including observations of 
voluntary worker changes in distance through residential moves may bias estimation results, but 
including these changes through job moves does not bias the results. In the current paper, we 
discuss the results of a specification using commuting distance, and its square, and we explicitly 
allow for the nonlinear effect of income tax reduction associated with commuting. In addition, 
we also discuss the results which allow for the possibility that an increase in commuting distance 
induces a different wage effect than a decrease.  
 
3. Empirical analyses 
3.1. The data 
The data used in the empirical analysis are derived from annual register data from Statistics 
Denmark for the years 2003–2005. Our period of observation is thus three years. For each year 
on 31 December, we have information on worker’s residence location and the workers’ 
establishment workplace location, annual net wages, and a range of explanatory variables (e.g. 
number of children).9 Commuting distances have been calculated using information on exact 
residence and workplace addresses using the shortest route. For convenience, we will refer to 
establishments as firms. 
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 Wage data are derived from workers’ pay slips which are observed by Danish Tax Authorities. 
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3.2. Selection of sample and descriptive statistics 
We observe the full population of 321,337 firms10 and 2,710,462 workers. We select firms that 
changed address between January 2004 and December 2004 (11,314 firms; 64,643 workers). 
Records with missing information (4,209 firms; 5,857 workers); workers with more than 1 job 
(3,122 firms; 15,576 workers) and part-time workers (1,948 firms; 23,485 workers) were 
excluded. Furthermore, we excluded 337 observations referring to address changes that did not 
imply a change in commuting distance.11 Moreover, observations for which commuting distance 
is greater than 100 km (179 firms; 878 workers), change in commuting distance is greater than 
50 kilometers (19 firms; 434 workers), and the absolute change in log(wage) is greater than 0.5 
(167 firms; 1,474 workers) were excluded as they were assumed to be outliers. Our econometric 
approach is based on a sample of (maximally) 1,333 firms and 8,601 workers. The full sample 
selection process can be found in Appendix A (Table A1). 
Our focus is on a sample of workers who stayed with their firm and did not change 
residence from January 2003 to December 2005 (1,144 firms; 6,165 workers). We use wage data 
for the years 2003 and 2005, because within these years the commuting distance is constant 
(which is not the case for 2004). So, in the analysis, we focus on annual changes between 2003 
and 2005. The data also contains information on worker’s job function, so we are able to control 
for promotions.12 
                                                     
10
 The statistical unit of firms is an administrative unit used by the tax authorities' register of enterprises liable to 
VAT. These units are identified by their so-called SE number. In most cases, the SE number unit is identical to the 
legal unit, i.e. the enterprise, but an enterprise might choose to split its registration up into several SE numbers (a 
divided registration). We assume that each SE number is a separate firm. 
11
 One reason may be a change in street name, or building number, but it may also occur given a move within the 
same building (e.g. from one floor to another). 
12
 Variable ‘change in workers function’ is computed from labour market administrative register's variable 
RASDISCO, which is a 4-digit function code, including more than thousand different function descriptions. For 
some industries, particular for government sector, consulting etc., it is common practice that workers change 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Change in commuting distance (km) -0.4537 14.3492 -49.9630 49.8160 
Abs change in commuting distance (km) 9.2884 10.9461 0.0010 49.9630 
log(wage2005)–log(wage2003) 0.0526 0.1841 -0.4994 0.4979 
Change in workers function  0.4819 0.4997 0.0000 1.0000 
Workers with commuting distance between 12.5 and 50  km in 2005 (share) 0.4381 0.4962 0.0000 1.0000 
Workers with commuting distance > 50 km in 2005 (share) 0.0616 0.2405 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Number of observations: 6,165. 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of variables of interest. They show, as one may expect 
given random sampling, that the average change in commuting distance is close to zero. The 
average absolute change is 9.29 km, which is substantial compared to the average level of 
distance (17.50 km). So, we have a sufficient number of large exogenous changes in commuting 
distance. The share of workers entitled to a tax reduction (those with one way commute that 
exceeds 12.5 kilometres) is approximately 50%.  
We have also calculated the correlation between changes in commuting distance and 
changes in wages, which appears to be 0.08. This is in line with a range of other studies (see e.g. 
Manning, 2003) although these studies include the change in distance and not only changes 
induced by firm relocations. The positive correlation suggests that variation in the commuting 
distance is important for determining variation in wages.  
 
4. Empirical results 
The econometric results of several specifications of first-differences models based on (2) 
are shown in Table 2. In these specifications, we initially do not correct for any sample selection 
effect. The first two columns show the results for a linear and a quadratic specification of 
commuting distance and where we also allow the distance effect to depend on whether the one-
way commuting distance is between 12.5 and 50 kilometres or exceeds 50 kilometres, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
function every 2nd or 4th year. This explains the high percentage of workers that change function from 2003 to 
2005. 
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whether workers are entitled to an income tax reduction associated with commuting. The effect 
of commuting distance appears to be statistically significant and positive (within the relevant 
range) in all specifications. We also find evidence that the marginal effect is not linear, in line 
with the fact that income tax reduction apply to longer distances only and that the time cost of 
commuting is concave function of distance. Concavity makes sense. Speed of travel is strongly 
increasing in distance, implying that marginal costs of distance are smaller for longer distance. 
The quadratic specification [2] implies a marginal effect of 0.0049 for a minimal commuting 
distance. The marginal effect is only slightly lower at let’s say 10 km, but substantially lower at 
the average commuting distance, where income tax reductions apply (see last two columns of 
Table 3). The marginal effect of commuting distance just above 12.5 where income tax 
reductions apply is 0.00190 (s.e. is 0.00041). It is positive up to 50 kilometres which applies to 
the large majority of observations (94%). For very long distances, the marginal time losses due 
to an increase in distance are too small to identify plausibly due to a high speed as well as 
income tax reductions. We do not reject the hypothesis that the marginal effect is zero at 
commuting distance just above 50 km suggesting that income tax reductions fully compensate 
for commuting time costs. 
Both specifications imply that, for the commuting distance range where the income tax 
reduction does not apply, an increase in commuting distance by 1 kilometre induces on average a 
wage increase of 0.42%.13 This is an economically significant effect. For example, if the 
commuting distance to a firm increases by 10 km, which is about the average change of a firm 
that relocates, wages increase by approximately 4.2%. This corresponds to 46.78 DKK per 
working day, or 2.34 DKK per additional kilometre travelled per day worked. Given a 
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 The effects are not different when we estimate the same models on sample including only workers with 
commuting distance below 12.5 kilometres for which income tax reductions are not applicable (see Appendix B). 
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commuting speed of 35 km/h (this speed applies to distances of about 10 km), the compensation 
is about 81.86 DKK per hour, or 49.43% of the net hourly wage (which is 165.59 DKK on 
average). This estimate is likely an underestimate because it assumes that workers travel each 
day to their workplace, which is not the case due to business travel, teleworking and 
absenteeism.14 Assuming that workers commute 90% of their workdays, the compensation will 
be closer to 54% of the hourly wage. Transport economists typically find that the value of time 
for commuters is about 50% of the wage (Small and Verhoef, 2007). This result seems to hold 
for Denmark.15 Monetary costs are typically of the same magnitude (Van Ommeren and 
Fosgerau, 2009). This result implies that workers bargain for about half a commuting costs. Our 
implicit estimate of the bargaining parameter is consistent with those reported in a number of 
papers in the labour market literature. Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) propose in their survey 
paper a value of 0.5 for this parameter.16 
The marginal effect of commuting distance at the average commuting distance (17.5 km) 
is 0.0017. This corresponds to 1.9 DKK per working day, or 0.94 DKK per kilometre travelled 
per day worked. Given a commuting speed of 35 km/h, the compensation is now about 33.13 
DKK per hour, or 22.01% of the net hourly wage, again about half of the commuting costs 
related to time losses. 
Our empirical results are consistent with those reported in a number of papers in the 
urban economics literature that examine the relationship between wages and commutes (but 
which ignore endogeneity issues as emphasized by Manning (2003)). For example, Madden 
(1985) investigates how wages vary with distance from the central business district (CBD). She 
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 Absenteeism rates are about 3% and the sum of business travel and teleworking occur likely at similar rate. 
15
 Fosgerau et al. (2007) estimated value of time of 76 DKK per hour for Danish commuters for year 2005. 
16
 Shimer (2005) proposes a value of 0.4 as a value for the worker's bargaining power parameter (based on the 
interpretation of this parameter as unemployment insurance), while Hall (2008) suggests 0.7 if one permits a broader 
interpretation of this variable. Cahuc et al. (2006) estimated the bargaining power of workers between 0 and 0.33.  
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regresses change in commuting distance on the change in wages for workers who changed job, 
changed residence, or both. For workers who changed job, she reports a positive relationship 
between wage and commuting distance changes. 
Table 2. First-difference wage model with firm fixed-effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 all observations  abs. change in commuting distance>500m 
Change in commuting distance 0.00423*** 
(0.00066) 
0.00494*** 
(0.00074) 
 0.00433*** 
(0.00070) 
0.00502*** 
(0.00078) 
 
Change in commuting distance 
       squared / 100 
 
 
-0.00194** 
(0.00091) 
  -0.00189** 
(0.00095) 
 
Change in commuting distance (increase)  
 
 
 
   0.00443*** 
(0.00076) 
Change  in commuting distance (decrease)  
 
    0.00425*** 
(0.00074) 
Change in commuting distance * D12.5 -0.00263*** 
(0.00058) 
-0.00256*** 
(0.00058) 
 -0.00264*** 
(0.00061) 
-0.00258*** 
(0.00061) 
-0.00265*** 
(0.00061) 
Change in commuting distance * D50 -0.00374*** 
(0.00064) 
-0.00315*** 
(0.00070) 
 -0.00377*** 
(0.00068) 
-0.00320*** 
(0.00073) 
-0.00379*** 
(0.00068) 
Change in worker’s function 0.01912*** 
(0.00527) 
0.01914*** 
(0.00526) 
 0.02418*** 
(0.00605) 
0.02423*** 
(0.00605) 
0.02425*** 
(0.00606) 
Firm fixed effects (1,144) Yes Yes  Yes Yes yes 
R-squared 0.3600 0.3606  0.3690 0.3696 0.3690 
No. of observations 6165 6165  5085 5085 5085 
Notes: Dependent variable is change in logarithm of wage; D12.5 is dummy variable indicating if the worker one-way commuting distance is 
between 12.5 and 50 km; D50 is dummy variable indicating if the worker one-way commuting distance exceeds 50 km; *** indicates that 
estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The results are almost identical if one excludes observations referring to changes in 
commuting distance smaller than 500 meters (see the last three columns in Table 2).17 We have 
also estimated models that distinguish between different effects of increases and decreases in 
commuting distance (see the last column in Table 2). A F-test (F=0.1403; p-value=0.7080) does 
not reject the null hypothesis that these effects are identical. As nominal wage decreases are 
extremely uncommon for workers who stay with the same firm, this indicates that workers with 
reduced distances receive smaller nominal wage increases than other workers in the same firm.  
We have estimated the same models on other, less-selective, samples of data. So we have 
included data on (i) workers who change employer, (ii) workers who change residence, and (iii) 
workers who change both employer and residence. The effects of commuting distance, reported 
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 These changes in distances are usually economically of no importance, but are relatively common in our data 
(18% of observations). 
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in Table 3, are very similar to the results reported in Table 2, except for a sample that includes 
residence change, most likely because distance changes of residential movers are compensated 
on the housing market (in line with theory, see Zenou, 2009).18 
Table 3. First-difference wage model. Effect of distance. 
Sample 
N 
Change in 
commuting 
distance 
Change in 
commuting 
distance   
squared/100 
Change in 
commuting 
distance * 
D12.5 
Wage effect 
at commuting 
distance of 
10km 
Wage effect at 
average 
commuting 
distance (17.5km) 
Sample used for Table 2 6,165 0.00490*** 
(0.00070) 
-0.00194** 
(0.00091) 
-0.00256*** 
(0.00058) 
0.00455*** 
(0.00074) 
0.00170*** 
(0.00041) 
Sample including employer change 7,248 0.00431*** 
(0.00067) 
-0.00222** 
(0.00082) 
-0.00197*** 
(0.00052) 
0.00387*** 
(0.00067) 
0.00156*** 
(0.00037) 
Sample including residence change 7,338 0.00109*** 
(0.00026) 
0.00056 
(0.00070) 
-0.00024 
(0.00032) 
0.00120*** 
(0.00026) 
0.00105*** 
(0.00030) 
Sample including employer and    
     residence change 
8,601 0.00110*** 
(0.00024) 
0.00029 
(0.00064) 
-0.00018 
(0.00030) 
0.00116*** 
(0.00024) 
0.00102*** 
(0.00027) 
Heckman selection model (selection  
     regarding residence change) 
8,601 0.00477*** 
(0.00067) 
-0.00221** 
(0.00081) 
-0.00239*** 
(0.00052) 
0.00433*** 
(0.00067) 
0.00161*** 
(0.00037) 
Heckman selection model (selection  
     regarding employer change) 
8,601 0.00535*** 
(0.00074) 
-0.00194** 
(0.00091) 
-0.00294*** 
(0.00058) 
0.00496*** 
(0.00073) 
0.00173*** 
(0.00041) 
Heckman selection model (selection  
     regarding residence and employer changes) 
8,601 0.00480*** 
(0.00068) 
-0.00197** 
(0.00082) 
-0.00247*** 
(0.00053) 
0.00441*** 
(0.00067) 
0.00164*** 
(0.00037) 
Notes: *** indicates that estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
An alternative, and usually better, way to examine selection sample issues is to estimate 
Heckman selection models. The inclusion of instruments in the first step of the models is based 
on the presence of search frictions in labour and housing markets. Given these frictions, the 
spatial configuration of jobs and residence affects job and residential mobility (Manning, 2003). 
It seems however reasonable to assume that the spatial configuration of jobs and residences does 
not directly affect annual changes in wages, so we use this configuration as an instrument. For 
single-wage earners, the spatial configuration is captured by the commuting distance. For two-
earner households, it is captured by three variables: the commuting distances of both wage 
earners as well as the distance between the workplaces of the wage earners.19 In Table 3, we 
                                                     
18
 The full results of the estimates are provided in Appendix C (Table C1- C3). 
19
 Deding et al. (2009) hypothesize that residential mobility depends positively on the commuting distances of both 
spouses, but negatively on the distance between workplaces. Further, workers' job mobility depends positively on 
the worker's commuting distance, negatively on the spouse's commuting distance, and positively on the distance 
between workplaces. Using data for Denmark, Deding et al. (2009) show that these hypotheses hold, and that the 
effects of spatial configuration are rather large. 
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report the results of Heckman selection models using the spatial configuration of jobs and 
residence as instrument. Accounting for sample selectivity in this way does not change our main 
result.20 We have also estimated Heckman selection models applying another set of instruments. 
We control for number of children up to 12 years old, but use the presence of children in the age 
between 12 and 18 as an instrument. Children in this age group likely have no direct effect on 
changes of wages, but strongly affect residential, but also job, mobility. The results obtained 
from Heckman selection models applying these instruments are almost identical to the results 
presented above (see Appendix D). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the causal effect of commuting distance on wages using matched register 
data for firms and workers for Denmark. We deal with the endogeneity of commuting distance 
by means of an innovative approach using changes in commuting distance that are due to firm 
relocations and therefore exogenous. We take into account that above 12.5 kilometres income tax 
reductions apply. We show that, for the commuting distance range where the income tax 
reductions associated with commuting do not apply, commuting distance increases imply an 
overall hourly wage compensation of about 49% on average. The effect of commuting distance 
at the average commuting distance, where income tax reduction is applicable, is much lower, i.e. 
about 22%. The effect becomes zero at commuting distance of 50 kilometres. The estimated 
positive effect of change in commuting distance on wages is consistent with wage bargaining, 
and due to the quasi-natural experimental setup, excludes other competing explanations. Our 
results imply wage bargaining parameter of about 0.5 for both the range in commuting distance 
where the income tax reduction associated with commuting is not applicable and for commuting 
                                                     
20
 The full results of the Heckman selection models are provided in Appendix D. 
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distances where income tax reduction is applicable.  The results appear robust with specification 
and accounting for selection effects. 
Our findings have a number of implications. First it demonstrates that wage bargaining 
with respect to commuting is an important characteristic of the (Danish) labour market, in line 
with range of theoretical models (Marimom and Zilibotti, 1999). So it is able to demonstrate that 
employer have some labour market power and pay below workers productivity (Pissarides, 
2000). Second, evidence of a wage-commute relationship puts a price on commuting distance 
and points to the economic benefits from transport infrastructure improvements. 
 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1. Sample selection procedure 
  Workers Firms 
1 Address changes, total 64,643 11,314 
2 Workers with more than 1 job, part-time workers and missing information 44,918 9,279 
2.1      Missing information regarding number of jobs 1,713 638 
2.2      Missing information regarding part-time / full –time job  3,404 3,178 
2.3      Missing information regarding worker’s wage 740 393 
2.4      More than 1 job (in the last year) 15,576 3,122 
2.5      Workers without full-time job (that last at least 1 year, continuously)  23,485 1,948 
3=1-2 Address changes 19,725 2,035 
4 Change in commuting distance = 0 8,338 337 
5=3-4  11,387 1,698 
6 Commuting distance > 100 km 878 179 
7=5-6  10,509 1,519 
8 Change in log(wage)>0.5 1,474 167 
9=7-8  9,035 1,302 
10 Change in commuting distance > 50 km 434 19 
11=9-10 Full sample 8,601 1,333 
12 Change in residence 1,263 192 
13 Employer change 1,353 130 
14=11-12 Sample 1 (exclude change in residence) 7,338 1,267 
15=11-13 Sample 2 (exclude employer change) 7,248 1,201 
16 Sample 3 (exclude residence and employer changes) 6,165 1,144 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. First-difference wage model with firm fixed-effects (commuting distance < 12.5 km) 
 [1]                 [2]                                 [3] 
 all observations                              abs. change in commuting distance>500m 
Change in commuting distance  0.00504*** (0.00108) 
0.00507*** 
(0.00507)  
Change in commuting distance (increase)   
 
 
0.00407 
(0.00261) 
Change  in commuting distance (decrease)   
 
 0.00585*** 
(0.00220) 
Change in worker’s function  0.03034*** (0.00907) 
0.03944*** 
(0.01228) 
0.03870*** 
(0.01241) 
Firm fixed effects (1,144)  Yes Yes yes 
R-squared  0.4622 0.4932 0.4933 
No. of observations  2097 1598 1598 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
 
 
Appendix C 
Table C1. First-difference wage model with firm fixed-effects. Sample includes employer and residence 
changes 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] [5] 
 all observations  excl.|change in commuting distance|<500m 
Change in commuting distance 0.00111*** 
(0.00024) 
0.00110*** 
(0.00024) 
 0.00115*** 
(0.00025) 
0.00114*** 
(0.00025) 
 
Change in commuting distance squared / 100  
 
0.00029 
(0.00064) 
  0.00032 
(0.00067) 
 
Change in commuting distance (increase)  
 
 
 
   0.00135*** 
(0.00030) 
Change in commuting distance (decrease)  
 
    0.00081** 
(0.00033) 
Change in commuting distance * D12.5 -0.00009 
(0.00022) 
-0.00018 
(0.00030) 
 -0.00008 
(0.00023) 
-0.00018 
(0.00031) 
-0.00002 
(0.00023) 
Change in commuting distance * D50 -0.00080*** 
(0.00024) 
-0.00097** 
(0.00046) 
 -0.00082*** 
(0.00025) 
-0.00101** 
(0.00048) 
-0.00077*** 
(0.00025) 
Change in worker’s function 0.02748*** 
(0.00388) 
0.02748*** 
(0.00388) 
 0.03005*** 
(0.00445) 
0.03005*** 
(0.00445) 
0.02926*** 
(0.00449) 
Firm fixed effects (1,333) yes Yes  Yes yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2836 0.2836  0.2871 0.2871 0.2872 
No. observations 8601 8601  7234 7234 7234 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
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Table C2. First-difference wage model with firm fixed-effects. Sample included employer changes 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] [5] 
 all observations  excl.|change in commuting distance|<500m 
Change in commuting distance 0.00347*** 
(0.00060) 
0.00431*** 
(0.00067) 
 0.00355*** 
(0.00062) 
0.00437*** 
(0.00070) 
 
Change in commuting distance squared / 100  
 
-0. 00222** 
(0.00082) 
  -0. 00216** 
(00085) 
 
Change in commuting distance (increase)  
 
 
 
   0.00386*** 
(0.00067) 
Change in commuting distance (decrease)  
 
    0.00331*** 
(0.00065) 
Change in commuting distance * D12.5 -0.00203*** 
(0.00052) 
-0.00197*** 
(0.00052) 
 -0.00205*** 
(0.00054) 
-0.00200*** 
(0.00054) 
-0.00207*** 
(0.00054) 
Change in commuting distance * D50 -0.00298*** 
(0.00057) 
-0.00235*** 
(0.00061) 
 -0.00302*** 
(0.00060) 
-0.00241*** 
(0.00064) 
-0.00306*** 
(0.00060) 
Change in worker’s function 0.02563*** 
(0.00418) 
0.02573*** 
(0.00417) 
 0.02789*** 
(0.00490) 
0.02804*** 
(0.00490) 
0.02708*** 
(0.00494) 
Firm fixed effects (1,201) Yes Yes  yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3033 0.3041  0.3131 0.3140 0.3133 
No. observations 7248 7248  6153 6153 6153 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C3. First-difference wage model with firm fixed-effects. Sample includes residence changes 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] [5] 
 all observations  excl.|change in commuting distance|<500m 
Change in commuting distance 0.00111*** 
(0.00026) 
0.00109*** 
(0.00026) 
 0.00117*** 
(0.00028) 
0.00115*** 
(0.00028) 
 
Change in commuting distance squared / 100  
 
0.00056 
(0.00070) 
  0.00057 
(0.00073) 
 
Change in commuting distance (increase)  
 
 
 
   0.00134*** 
(0.00035) 
Change in commuting distance (decrease)  
 
    0.00096** 
(0.00038) 
Change in commuting distance * D12.5 -0.00007 
(0.00024) 
-0.00024 
(0.00032) 
 -0.00007 
(0.00025) 
-0.00024 
(0.00034) 
-0.00004 
(0.00025) 
Change in commuting distance * D50 -0.00078*** 
(0.00027) 
-0.00112** 
(0.00050) 
 -0.00081*** 
(0.00028) 
-0.00116** 
(0.00053) 
-0.00079*** 
(0.00028) 
Change in worker’s function 0.02223*** 
(0.00465) 
0.02221*** 
(0.00465) 
 0.02847*** 
(0.00524) 
0.02844*** 
(0.00524) 
0.02842*** 
(0.00524) 
Firm fixed effects (1,267) Yes Yes  yes yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3190 0.3191  0.3219 0.3220 0.3220 
No. observations 7338 7338  6221 6221 6221 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
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Appendix D 
Table D1. Heckman selection models. Estimates of logarithm of changes in wage with changes in 
commuting distance, firm fixed-effects. 
  [1] [2] [3]       [4]      [5]      [6] 
Lo
g
a
ri
th
m
 o
f 
ch
a
n
g
e
s 
in
 w
a
g
e
 
Change in commuting distance 0.00477*** 
(0.00067) 
0.00535*** 
(0.00074) 
0.00480*** 
(0.00068) 
0.00479*** 
(0.00067) 
0.00531*** 
(0.00074) 
0.00480*** 
(0.00068) 
Change in commuting distance  
     squared / 100 
-0.00221** 
(0.00081) 
-0.00194** 
(0.00091) 
-0.00197** 
(0.00082) 
-0.00214** 
(0.00081) 
-0.00192** 
(0.00091) 
-0.00194** 
(0.00082) 
Change in commuting distance  
     * D12.5 
-0.00239*** 
(0.00052) 
-0.00294*** 
(0.00058) 
-0.00247*** 
(0.00053) 
-0.00238*** 
(0.00052) 
-0.00291*** 
(0.00058) 
-0.00246*** 
(0.00053) 
Change in commuting distance  
     * D50 
-0.00288*** 
(0.00063) 
-0.00354*** 
(0.00069) 
-0.00304*** 
(0.00064) 
-0.00287*** 
(0.00063) 
-0.00351*** 
(0.00069) 
-0.00304*** 
(0.00064) 
Change in worker’s function 0.01819*** 
(0.00471) 
0.01566*** 
(0.00513) 
0.01840*** 
(0.00478) 
0.01841*** 
(0.00472) 
0.01482*** 
(0.00514) 
0.01837*** 
(0.00478) 
Dummy indicating 1 child    0.01871*** 
(0.00622) 
0.01370** 
(0.00656) 
0.01713** 
(0.00637) 
Dummy indicating 2 children    0.01457** 
(0.00628) 
0.00811 
(0.00609) 
0.01271** 
(0.00634) 
Dummy indicating 3 or more  
     children 
   0.01909* 
(0.01004) 
0.01715* 
(0.01058) 
0.01712* 
(0.01007) 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
 i
s 
d
u
m
m
y
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
 t
h
a
t 
d
e
fi
n
e
s 
th
e
 s
e
le
ct
io
n
 
Change in commuting distance -0.01481*** 
(0.00179) 
-0.01265** 
(0.00503) 
-0.01184*** 
(0.00163) 
-0.01228*** 
(0.00176) 
-0.01291*** 
(0.00501) 
-0.01085*** 
(0.00160) 
Change in commuting distance 
     squared / 100 
-0.00678 
(0.00515) 
0.03425 
(0.00629) 
-0.00226 
(0.00445) 
-0.08096 
(0.05338) 
0.00244 
(0.06126) 
-0.00211** 
(0.00449) 
Change in commuting distance  
     * D12.5 
0.00649** 
(0.00235) 
0.00974** 
(0.00387) 
0.00674*** 
(0.00203) 
0.00809*** 
(0.00239) 
0.00956** 
(0.00387) 
0.00708*** 
(0.00204) 
Change in commuting distance  
     * D50 
0.00825** 
(0.00373) 
0.01076** 
(0.00459) 
0.00773*** 
(0.00317) 
0.01043** 
(0.00385) 
0.01060** 
(0.00456) 
0.00830*** 
(0.00319) 
Change in worker’s function -0.10028** 
(0.03578) 
-0.06952** 
(0.03290) 
-0.05628** 
(0.02867) 
-0.11304*** 
(0.03609) 
-0.06816** 
(0.03278) 
-0.05311* 
(0.02871) 
Commuting distance 
      (inst.) 
-0.00704*** 
(0.00115) 
0.00237** 
(0.00098) 
-0.00284*** 
(0.00096) 
  
 
 
Commuting distance for 
      spouse (inst.) 
0.00006 
(0.00102) 
0.00095 
(0.00089) 
0.00117 
(0.00082) 
   
Distance between workplaces  
     (inst.) 
0.00432*** 
(0.00093) 
-0.00277*** 
 (0.00053) 
0.00002 
(0.00058) 
   
Dummy indicating 1 child    0.26229***  
(0.05211) 
0.05324  
(0.04509) 
0.19066***  
(0.04101) 
Dummy indicating 2 children    0.47242*** 
(0.05468) 
0.02905 
(0.04296) 
0.27109*** 
(0.04086) 
Dummy indicating 3 or more  
     children 
   0.44445*** 
(0.10289) 
0.01332 
(0.07383) 
0.22748*** 
(0.07219) 
Dummy indicating presence of 
      children 12-18 years old  (inst.) 
   0.20456*** 
(0.05206) 
-0.11123*** 
(0.03151) 
0.04354  
(0.03554) 
Intercept 1.13476*** 
(0.03458) 
0.86710*** 
(0.02972) 
0.60122*** 
(0.02774) 
0.88097*** 
(0.02889) 
0.87916*** 
(0.02761) 
0.45019*** 
(0.02364) 
 Sigma 0.15506*** 
(0.00183) 
0.18177*** 
(0.00244) 
0.15525*** 
(0.00210) 
0.15378*** 
(0.00159) 
0.18249*** 
(0.00241) 
0.15441*** 
(0.00179) 
 Rho 0.23939*** 
(0.08353) 
-0.83025***  
(0.01636) 
0.16996 
(0.11363) 
0.13022 
(0.10630) 
-0.83784***  
(0.01529) 
0.10310 
(0.13848) 
 Log Likelihood -355 -882 -2481 -283 -887 -2441 
 No. Observations 8601 8601 8601 8601 8601 8601 
Notes: (1) Columns [1] and [4] account for selection regarding residence change; columns [2] and [5] account for selection regarding employer 
change, columns [3] and [6] account for selection regarding both changes. 
(2) Max.likelihood method is used to estimate the model. The coefficient associated with inverse Mills ratios is defined as σ multiplied with ρ. 
(3) ***,**,* indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, at the 0.05 and the 0.10 level, respectively.  
(4) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
(5) All explanatory variables in the selection equation are in 2003, so prior to the (possible) move. 
(6) Instruments are indicated with bold type.  
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